Introduction
This survey classifies and analyzes patent settlements reached between innovator drug makers and their generic rivals over the past fourteen years, and the antitrust suits and investigations initiated in response. Thirty settlements involving twenty drugs fall within its scope. Several patterns emerge from the data.
Continued expansion in antitrust activity. Settlements involving ten drugs have attracted antitrust suits or Federal Trade Commission investigations that are currently pending-sixteen suits and three investigations in all, not counting multiple suits consolidated in a single jurisdiction. The first settlement, a 1993 agreement to delay entry and settle a patent dispute involving the cancer drug tamoxifen, attracted a challenge that is pending as a petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court. 1 Not all settlements have antitrust challenges pending. Antitrust challenges to a few settlements have been resolved, and a few settlements never attracted an antitrust challenge. For example, the maker of Zantac, the first blockbuster drug, apparently paid $133 million to a generic rival, plus other consideration, to resolve a patent dispute. The Zantac settlement never invited antitrust attention, perhaps because the terms were not made public.
Emergence of repeat players. Of the seventeen innovators and eighteen generic firms that are party to the settlements, a few appear repeatedly. Generic firm Barr Laboratories, for example, reached settlements with respect to eight different drugs. Barr's first three settlements-tamoxifen, Cipro, and Ovcon 35-yielded antitrust suits that are pending as, respectively, a petition for certiorari, a Second Circuit appeal, and a district court suit. Its last three settlementsAdderall XR, Provigil, and Actiq-are the subjects of FTC investigations. 2 Increased sophistication in second-wave settlements. The settlements have occurred in two distinct waves. The first wave occurred between 1993 and 2000.
FTC antitrust enforcement activity then halted settlements for a few years. But rulings adverse to antitrust liability by two federal appeals courts in 2005 and 2006 3 have led to a new wave of settlements.
The two waves share a basic structure: the innovator confers value upon the generic firm, and the generic firm agrees to delay entry. Second-wave settlements differ from first-wave settlements, however, in their sophistication. For example, second-wave agreements provide for generic entry prior to, rather than only after, patent expiration. Moreover, in many second-wave settlements the generic firm provides value to the innovator that is distinct from delayed entry. The additional value takes several forms, including intellectual property, product development, manufacturing, supply, inventory, and promotion. This contribution of additional consideration complicates antitrust evaluation. In addition, second-wave settlements lack restrictions on entry with respect to noninfringing products, one of the bases used to challenge first-wave settlements.
This survey is the first to offer a comprehensive account of the agreements and subsequent antitrust activity. It builds upon FTC reports in 2002, 2006 and 2007 4 that, unlike the present study, do not discuss individual agreements in detail or by name. For several settlements, this survey describes important settlement terms that can be inferred from FTC reports-for example, the size of the cash payment in the Zantac settlement.
The scope of the study is limited in several respects. First, it understates settlement activity due to its reliance on public information. Some settlements are clearly missing, judging from the settlement counts reported by the FTC. Second, some settlements have been omitted. For a drug to be included, an innovator must have entered into an agreement with a generic firm that was first to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"). All but one 5 of the drugs in the study are protected by one or more patents, and the filed ANDA 3 See Schering-Plough Corp. v IN FY 2006 (link) . 5 The exception is Ovcon 35. See Part IV.B.1 infra.
asserts entitlement to offer the generic drug prior to patent expiration because every relevant patent is invalid or not infringed. Moreover, other practices in the pharmaceutical industry raising potential antitrust concern are outside the study's scope, including agreements between generic firms, "product hopping," and manipulation of the FDA citizen petition and Hatch-Waxman automatic stay processes. The study presumes familiarity with the complex regulatory structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 6 The survey proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the agreements and subsequent antitrust activity. Part II analyzes the shift over time in the mechanisms of payment and delay. Parts III and IV describe in detail the particular agreements that compose each wave of settlement.
I. Settlements in summary
The following pages present innovator-generic agreements in tabular form. The agreements are organized by drug, in chronological order according to the date of agreement with the first filer. For each drug, the table indicates annual sales, the parties to and major terms of each settlement, and any antitrust activity. For seven drugs, the innovator reached agreement with multiple generic firms. A few of these settlements are with multiple generic firms, each of which has first-filer status, and thus shares in potential entitlement to generic exclusivity. In the case of Provigil, for example, Cephalon settled with four different firms that each filed on the first possible day and therefore shared in potential entitlement to the exclusivity period. Other settlements are with a generic firm the filed later and thus lacked entitlement; these settlements are marked "(L)" in the chart.
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The agreed-upon entry date varies widely. Many first-wave settlements, including tamoxifen, BuSpar, Zantac, and Cipro, provided for entry only upon expiration of the relevant patent protection. Second-wave settlements generally provide for a pre-expiration entry date. This was an innovation of the K-Dur settlements, part of the first wave, that has been widely adopted in second-wave agreements. For some settlements, the pre-expiration entry date is very close to expiration-in the case of the Plavix settlement, for example, eight months before. Others are earlier, as with Niaspan's agreed-upon entry in 2013, four years before patent expiration. Pre-expiration entry may nevertheless be at or after the end of the drug's period of profitability, due to the pre-expiration onset of generic competition in a competing therapy, the arrival of a superior, competing brand-name drug, or the innovator's own plans to shift customers to a line extension or next-generation therapy.
Other settlement terms also vary widely, but their discussion is deferred to Part II; nevertheless, three clarifications of the chart may be useful. Terms benefiting the generic firm are marked "G", and those benefiting the innovator are marked "I". As for cash, where the public information indicates a range of cash payments, only the maximum is reported in the chart. Finally, in some settlements, the generic firm sells innovator-provided product under the generic firm's label. In others, the opposite occurs, and the generic firm provides product to the innovator. The term "supply agreement" is sometimes used to describe both practices. In this survey, only the generic firm's provision of product to the innovator is called a supply agreement; an innovator's provision of product to the generic firm is called "private label sales."
These settlements have attracted a great deal of antitrust activity, including private suits and agency investigations, consent decrees, and litigation. As noted in the introduction, ten drugs have pending activity. In a number of the challenges, a court has expressed a view about the merits, and this is indicated in the chart in a rough manner by "NO" (a ruling against antitrust liability) or "YES" (a ruling in favor of liability).
II. The mechanisms of payment for delay
The settlements share a basic structure. In each, a generic firm seeks to market a generic version of an innovator's drug prior to the expiration of the innovator's patent protection on the drug. 8 The innovator, rather than take the chance that it might lose the suit, agrees to confer compensation upon the generic firm. The generic firm agrees to abandon its challenge and to delay entry.
The settlements vary considerably, however, in the forms of payment and delay. This Part draws upon the detailed accounts of each settlement provided in Part III to explain the forms that compensation and delayed entry may take. In this discussion, two common settlement terms are ignored and not discussed further: provisions that accelerate the generic launch date if another generic firm enters the market, and royalties paid by the generic firm upon its negotiated launch date.
A. Compensation to the generic firm
The settlements in the study suggest three principal ways in which an innovator can pay a generic firm. It can pay cash, including overpayment for goods and services provided by the generic firm. It can act to preserve a firstfiling generic firm's access to the lucrative 180-day period of generic exclusivity. And it can set a very low price for goods and services provided to the generic firm. Aside from these mechanisms, a few settlements may confer compensation that defies neat classification.
Cash and overpayment
The amount of cash paid varies greatly across the settlements. The Cipro settlement features the largest cash payment, $398 million. Other settlements with cash transfers exceeding $100 million 9 include Provigil ($219 million), Zantac ($133 million), and Adderall XR ($102 million). 10 Six more have cash payments in the $10 million to $100 million range, including BuSpar ($73 million), tamoxifen ($66 million), K-Dur ($60 million to the first filer and $30 million to a later filer), Hytrin ($45 million to a later filer), and Ovcon 35 ($20 million). In addition, the two "interim" settlements in the study included large cash payments. 11 These figures must be used with care. The size of cash compensation is often absent in public data altogether or as to particular deal components. Moreover, focusing only on cash provides an incomplete and misleading picture of compensation. Such a single-minded approach ignores other important forms of compensation to a generic firm, including preservation of exclusivity and a low transfer price.
Focusing on cash also makes it tempting to rely upon economically incorrect "safe harbors." For example, the fact that a cash payment is smaller than the litigation expense saved by settling-even if none of the other forms of compensation is present-does not itself render a payment procompetitive.
After all, both sides have litigation expense that they conserve by settling. Ordinarily, each party could simply pocket the saved expense, rather than one party paying the other. When the innovator pays the generic firm the entire amount of the innovator's saved expense, this can constitute payment for additional delay.
Evaluation of the cash component is complicated by the presence of simultaneous side deals. In first-wave settlements, such as tamoxifen, BuSpar, Zantac, and Cipro, the absence of a side deal made it relatively straightforward to conclude that the cash payment provided compensation for the generic firm's delayed entry. Second-wave settlements, by contrast, often feature a complex set of contemporaneous transactions in which the generic firm provides additional value, apart from the agreement to delay entry.
The earliest example of this development is actually a first-wave settlement, an agreement that drug maker Schering entered into with a generic rival with respect to the potassium replacement drug K-Dur. In exchange for cash, the first filing generic firm agreed both to delay entry and to supply licenses to other products. 12 The FTC's antitrust case challenging the agreement turned in part upon whether the cash payment made by Schering was consideration for the rival's delay or its licenses. One of the Eleventh Circuit's grounds for denying antitrust liability was its conclusion that the innovator's payment was consideration for the licenses.
It comes as no surprise, then, that side deals have been widely adopted in second-wave settlements. In general, the additional value provided by the generic firm is not something that the innovator had sought from the generic firm prior to the overall settlement, a signal that its value is low. Side deals take four principal forms.
Intellectual property and product development. The generic firm agrees to license its own intellectual property or to develop new products for sale by the innovator. The K-Dur settlement described above is an early example. Three of Cephalon's agreements with first-filing firms to settle Provigil patent suits include payments described as compensation for intellectual property. A fourth agreement includes a product development term. Similarly, one of the agreements settling Adderall XR patent litigation includes a provision that the generic firm will help develop additional products.
Manufacturing and supply. The generic firm agrees to provide manufacturing services or supply product to the innovator. The Ovcon 35 and Niaspan settlements include such a term, as do two of the Provigil settlements (a manufacturing and supply term as to generic firm Teva, supply only as to Ranbaxy). In the Adderall XR settlement described above, the generic firm agreed to provide manufacturing as to products that might emerge from the development agreement. One of two AndroGel settlements features a variation in which the generic firm provides "backup" manufacturing services.
Inventory. The generic firm agrees to provide its existing inventory of the drug. Agreements with inventory purchase terms include Cephalon's Provigil settlement with Barr and Bristol's Plavix settlement, never fully implemented, with Apotex.
Promotion. The generic firm agrees to promote the innovator's product. This is a term in the Niaspan settlement and both AndroGel settlements. In those settlements, the generic firm agreed to promote the product at issue in the litigation. In one of the Adderall XR settlements, the generic firm agreed instead to promote an unrelated product.
Preserving exclusivity
In many settlements, the generic firm retains eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period, by agreeing to enter at a particular future date that is at least 180 days prior to patent expiration. Many settlements include this feature, including K-Dur, Naprelan, Procardia XL, Niaspan, Effexor XR, Provigil (as to each of four first-filers), Plavix, and Adderall XR. 13 Retained exclusivity is a form of compensation worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a major drug. 14 The reason why retained exclusivity is valuable is somewhat subtle. Because the patent is never adjudicated, the generic firm does not risk the possibility that it might lose the patent suit. If the generic firm lost, it would be forced to wait until patent expiration-but more than that, it would lose the 180-day entitlement. By reaching an agreement on entry dates, the generic firm retains the entitlement, turning the mere probability of enjoying it (if it won the patent suit) to a near certainty. The generic firm is not absolutely certain of enjoying exclusivity because, for example, a later-filing generic firm might win a patent suit, triggering the first-filer's exclusivity period prior to the first filer's FDA approval. But assurance of non-interference from the innovator is still very valuable to a generic firm.
A generic firm can even make money from the exclusivity period when it does not actually enter, by insisting upon compensation from a later-filing generic firm as a condition for relinquishing its exclusivity and permitting the later filer to enter. (This is a consequence of the "bottleneck"; see Part II.B.2 for a discussion.) The generic firm in the Zantac settlement, for example, made money in this way. Although the firm did not enter, it accepted payment in exchange for allowing another firm's entry.
A related source of compensation is for the innovator to agree not to launch an "authorized generic" version of the product. The authorized generic issue arises when an innovator, faced with competition from a first-filing generic firm, recruits an additional generic firm to sell an unbranded version of the drug under the innovator's own license. The presence of an authorized generic reduces the value of the generic firm's exclusivity period. In some settlements, including Adderall XR and Plavix, the innovator agrees not to launch an authorized generic. 15 Such forbearance increases the value of exclusivity, potentially by a large amount. Thus an agreement to forgo an authorized generic, like retained eligibility itself, is a means to pay for delay.
Two other settlements, tamoxifen and Cipro, contain a weaker version of retained exclusivity. Both settlements provided that the generic firm would wait to enter until patent expiration, and the generic firm -in both cases Barr -altered its ANDA from paragraph IV to paragraph III. 16 But in each case, faced with the possibility of pre-expiration generic entry by other firms, Barr converted back from paragraph III to paragraph IV and asserted its continued entitlement to the exclusivity period.
Not all settlements include guaranteed exclusivity. This term may be missing for several reasons. First, the agreement may provide for no entry until patent expiration. Second, the agreement may not resolve the patent dispute, in which case the generic firm receives no assurance of being able to enjoy the exclusivity period. That was the case in the "incomplete" agreements-Hytrin, Cardizem CD, and Prozac-discussed in Part III.B. Third, some settling generic firms have no eligibility for exclusivity. This is true of later filers, such as the secondary settlements in Hytrin, K-Dur, Provigil, Adderall XR, and AndroGel. It is also true for first filers, where the applicable procedure provides no basis for exclusivity-for example, because there is no patent for the first filer to challenge, as in Ovcon 35, or because the particular procedure used for innovator approval does not allow for exclsuivity, as with Biaxin XL, or because the generic firm uses a procedure that does not provide for an exclusivity period, as with Alphagan. For a discussion of these settlements, see Part IV.B.
A final reason that might seem to undermine retained exclusivity turns out not to matter. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 limits the ability of a settling generic firm to retain eligibility by providing for forfeiture if the parties settle, but that provision does not apply to settlements resulting from ANDAs filed before the effective date of the Act. 17 Of the settlements in the survey in which the generic firm had potential eligibility for the exclusivity period, all but one are covered by the pre-MMA rules. 18 In the single exception, Actiq, the generic firm had no practical prospect of receiving the exclusivity period. 19 
Underpricing
Compensation may also be conferred by choosing a low price for goods transferred from the innovator to the generic firm. For example, the parties may arrange for private label sales, in which the innovator provides product that the generic firm sells under its own brand. The tamoxifen and Procardia XL 19 Barr's ANDA-IV in Actiq was filed sufficiently late as to leave little time to win a suit and enjoy the exclusivity period prior to patent expiration. See Part III for details.
settlements, for example, contain such a term. A private label deal, if it includes a low transfer price, permits net payment from an innovator to a generic firm. License terms are not public, so it is difficult to assess the extent of this practice.
Underpriced transfers are the flip side of overpriced side deals. For side deals, the concern is that the parties attribute an unrealistically high price to the value provided by the generic firm. For transfers, the concern is that the parties agree to an unduly low price for value provided by the innovator.
The transfer can extend to additional products not directly at issue, as in the Effexor XR and Adderall XR settlements. In both settlements, the innovator secured an agreement to delay entry in the newer extended-release version of the drug, but arranged for immediate generic use of the older immediate-release version. In the case of Effexor, this took the form of a product license; in Adderall, a sale of rights. Similarly, the private label sales in the Procardia XL settlement included dosage forms for which the generic firm was not the first filer. Again, the extent of compensation is difficult to evaluate with public information.
Additional channels
The innovator and generic firm may be adversaries in other disputes, the settlement of which can confer compensation upon the generic firm. For example, the Zantac settlement resolved patent litigation in other countries. Cephalon and Barr settled litigation involving two drugs, Provigil and Actiq, at the same time.
A further, unusual form of compensation is described in the most recent FTC settlement report (emphasis added):
The remaining case also had no explicit restriction on generic entry. It involved a complex set of transactions in which the brand manufacturer granted the generic company a license to an authorized generic of the capsule form of the product that was the subject of the litigation; the brand company acquired a new tablet form of the product at issue; the brand agreed to pay the generic a royalty on the sales of the acquired product; and then the parties dismissed the litigation involving the capsule form of the product. As one of the parties has disclosed, this set of transactions is under investigation by the FTC. 20 If this description is correct, the innovator agreed to pay the generic firm a royalty on a different form-the new form-rather than the form actually at issue in the litigation. This unusual feature may have been a part of the Actiq settlement between Cephalon and Barr. (For further discussion, see Part IV.A.4.)
B. Delay in generic entry
The delay in generic entry takes four principal forms: by neutralizing the challenge by the firm most motivated to test the innovator's patent protection; by creating a bottleneck that prevents FDA approval of later filers; by heading off entry during the period while a patent suit is pending; and through application to products not directly at issue in the litigation. 21
Neutralizing the first filer
In most settlements with first filers, the settlement has the effect of neutralizing the single firm with eligibility for exclusivity. Generic firms other than the first filer will lag behind in the approval process, if they have bothered to file at all; they will also be less motivated to initiate or vigorously pursue a challenge to the innovator's patents. The settlement removes from consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing competition.
Bottleneck
In some settlements, the entry of subsequent filers can be blocked entirely due to a statutory bottleneck created by the Hatch-Waxman regime. The 180-day exclusivity period operates by delaying FDA approval of a later-filing generic firm's ANDA-IV. In particular, the statute requires that a later-filed ANDA-IV not be approved until 180 days after the first filer's initiation of commercial marketing or a court determination of invalidity or noninfringement, whichever comes first. A settlement between the first ANDA-IV filer and the innovator removes an opportunity for commercial marketing or a court determination. Without the occurrence of either triggering event, the later ANDA-IV filer is stuck, for the FDA lacks authority to approve the application. The block is incomplete: if a later ANDA filer wins a favorable court decision, that decision triggers the exclusivity period-that is, the first filer's exclusivity period. The subsequent ANDA filer could enter 180 days later.
In a few first-wave settlements, such as tamoxifen, BuSpar, and Cipro, the generic firm relinquished exclusivity eligibility by changing its certification from paragraph IV to paragraph III. In the case of tamoxifen and Cipro, however, this did not entirely remove the bottleneck, for upon the emergence of other potential generic entrants, the generic firm (in both cases, Barr) reasserted continued entitlement to the exclusivity period.
Interim delay
In two settlements (Cardizem CD and Hytrin), the delay in entry took the form of a commitment not to launch "at risk"-that is, after FDA approval of generic entry, but before complete certainty emerged that the patent was invalid or not infringed. For example, when an innovator sues a generic firm for patent infringement, an automatic stay is entered that prevents generic entry for thirty months or more. Sometimes, however, the automatic stay expires before the district court has decided the patent suit, in which case FDA approval may be granted and the product launched despite the absence of a ruling. In that event, a commitment by the generic firm not to launch at risk can be a valuable interim benefit to an innovator. Moreover, in Hytrin the generic firm agreed to stay out even after the district court ruled in its favor, and the risk had significantly subsided.
Agreement as to noninfringing products
In several settlements, the agreement prevented entry not only as to the product directly at issue in the generic firm's ANDA, but other competing products as well. This was true of one of the K-Dur settlements, the Cardizem CD settlement, and both Hytrin settlements. The FTC and courts attacked this term as clearly outside the scope of the innovators' patents. Second-wave settlements omit this term.
III. First-wave settlements
This Part and the next provide detailed accounts of each settlement, drawn from court filings, press releases, news accounts, and, in a few cases where they have been made public, the actual agreements. 22 This Part describes first-wave settlements, organizing them according to whether the settlement fully resolves the underlying patent litigation. Settlements for seven drugs do so, and three do not.
A. Complete settlements 1. Tamoxifen
Tamoxifen citrate, sold by Zeneca under the brand name Nolvadex, is the "most prescribed cancer drug in the world." 23 Nolvadex's U.S. sales in 1992 totaled $265 million, which rose to $442 million in 2001, the last full year of sales prior to generic entry. 24 Zeneca 25 and first-filer Barr reached agreement in March 1993. 26 Zeneca agreed to pay $66.4 million: $21 million to Barr, and $9.5 million immediately and $35.9 million over ten years to Barr's raw materials supplier Heumann. In addition to cash, Barr received compensation through profitable private-label sales. Zeneca allowed Barr to sell Zeneca-made tamoxifen under Barr's label. The licensed version sold at a 15 percent discount to Zeneca's version. Barr soon captured most of the market.
The amount of compensation provided by the private-label arrangement is difficult to determine using public information. Its value may be indicated, however, by the different course taken in the Cipro settlement. There, the innovator had the option to implement a similar supply agreement, but chose instead to simply make large cash payments.
Barr also retained potential entitlement to the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. Barr initially changed its Paragraph IV certification to Paragraph III, thereby certifying that it would wait to enter until patent expiration. Yet Barr later reverted to a Paragraph IV certification, and asserted its continued entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity period when generic firm Mylan gained FDA's tentative approval to market a generic product.
From Zeneca's standpoint, the settlement neutralized the first-filer threat, by removing from litigation the single firm, Barr, with entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity period. The settlement also created a partial bottleneck, in the sense that Barr's reversion to a paragraph IV assertion limited the prospect for approval of later filers. Barr agreed to enter with its own ANDA product until August 2002, when a key Zeneca patent expired. 27 Generic manufacturers entered soon after the expiration of the patent. One further unusual feature of the agreement is that the parties agreed to seek vacatur of the district court's ruling that the relevant patent was invalid. The Federal Circuit granted vacatur. 28 The tamoxifen settlement has attracted numerous antitrust challenges, including 33 purchaser class action complaints. 29 In 2006, the Second Circuit dismissed on the merits. 30 33 Bristol paid Schein $72.5 million in four installments. Retained exclusivity was not a source of compensation to Schein, as no entry was contemplated prior to patent expiration. From Bristol's standpoint, the settlement neutralized the first-filer threat. The settlement also created a bottleneck: later ANDA-IV filers could not receive FDA approval until 180 days after entry of a first filer with exclusivity eligibility, so Schein's continued presence as a first filer blocked approval of later-filed ANDAs. Schein agreed to wait to enter with its own product until November 2000, when the key patent expired. 34 The BuSpar settlement attracted numerous antitrust challenges. The 
Zantac
Ranitidine, sold by Glaxo under the brand name Zantac, is an antiulcerant. Zantac was the world's best-selling prescription medicine in 1995, with U.S. sales of $2.15 billion. 38 To understand the settlement that resulted, it is necessary to review briefly the underlying patent suit. Two forms of ranitidine, "Form 1" and "Form 2," and two patents, are particularly relevant. At the time of the Zantac settlement, Form 1 ranitidine had never been made commercially and was considered relatively difficult to manufacture. Form 2 was the form actually used by Glaxo. The two forms are bioequivalent. Form 1 was protected by a patent that expired in July 1997. 39 Form 2 was protected by a patent that expired in December 2002. 40 First-filing generic firm Genpharm 41 sought to make a Form 2 product prior to patent expiration, and challenged not only the validity of the Form 2 patent, but also-and this was an unusual feature of the challenge-the validity of the basic Form 1 patent. The case was scheduled for a jury trial in October 1995. 42 Glaxo and Genpharm reached agreement in October 1995, on the eve of trial. 43 Glaxo likely paid Genpharm $132.5 million, a figure not publicly disclosed but inferred from an FTC report. 44 The agreement involving Product I included a delay of one year, nine months, which matches the delay between the Zantac agreement (in October 1995) and the expiration of the first patent in issue ('658, in July 1997). The agreement involving Product I resolved patent litigation in other countries, an unusual feature of the agreement. Similarly, the Glaxo-Genpharm pact settled Zantac litigation outside the United States. Drug Product I fits none of the other cases that have the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit, and received compensation, including a profit-sharing agreement, when it later waived exclusivity in favor of subsequent filer Granutec. 45 A federal appeals court described the transaction as "quite lucrative." Glaxo granted Genpharm and related companies licenses and supply agreements to sell a generic version of Zantac in several other countries. From Glaxo's standpoint, the settlement neutralized the first-filer threat. This was particularly important because Genpharm's challenge to the basic Form 1 patent was an unusual threat. The settlement did have a bottleneck potential, but Genpharm waived exclusivity in favor of Granutec in exchange for payment. Genpharm agreed to wait to enter with a Form 1 product until the Form 1 patent expired in July 1997 and to wait to enter with a Form 2 product until 2002. 46 The Form 2 restriction was significant because in 1995 it had not been established that a Form 1 product could be made without infringing the Form 2 patent, and Glaxo argued strongly (though ultimately unsuccessfully) to the contrary. Moreover, Form 1 had not yet been made in commercial quantities. Generic entry by Novopharm began in August 1997. The agreement also resolved patent litigation in other countries.
As the Financial Times described the Zantac settlement at the time, "With so much at stake, the fact that Glaxo is having to pay Genpharm to turn it from a competitor into a distributor is money well spent." 47 The settlement attracted no antitrust challenges. received antitrust attention from the FTC or private parties. At the time of the settlement, Glaxo described the amount of settlement as "not material," but a $132.5 million payment would not be considered material for a company as large as Glaxo. If Zantac is indeed Drug Product I, then the Zantac settlement, according to the FTC Report, entailed a payment of $132.5 million. 45 Granutec, a subsidiary of Novopharm, expected $150 to $200 million in sales from a one-month lead (part of the exclusivity period had expired) before other generic firms entered. Sandra Rubin, Novopharm Gets Zantac Deal, FIN. POST, Aug. 5, 1997 ("'It's a major coup for us,' said Novopharm chairman Leslie Dan. 'In two weeks we can literally blanket the U.S. market. And history tells us that whoever enters the market first will usually end up as the major supplier of the product for many, many years.'"). Novopharm also paid Glaxo more than $70 million for a related license. Id. 46 It appears that at the time of settlement, Genpharm had no ANDA filed on Form 1. See 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398 (noting 1996 filing of Genpharm ANDA-IV for Form 1). 47 See Soothing Glaxo's Ulcers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at 20.
Cipro
Ciprofloxacin, sold by Bayer under the brand name Cipro, is an antibiotic. Cipro was the most widely prescribed quinolone in 1995, with U.S. sales in 1996 of $680 million. 48 Bayer and first-filer Barr 49 reached agreement in January 1997. 50 Bayer paid Barr $398 million by December 2003: $49.1 million initially, followed by quarterly payments. Although the agreement provided for private label sales along the lines of the tamoxifen agreement, this provision was not implemented. Bayer exercised its option under the agreement to pay cash instead.
As with the tamoxifen agreement, Barr retained potential entitlement to the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. Barr initially changed its Paragraph IV certification to Paragraph III, thereby certifying that it would wait to enter until patent expiration. Yet Barr later reverted to a Paragraph IV certification, and asserted its continued entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity period. From Bayer's standpoint, the settlement neutralized the first-filer threat. The settlement also created a partial bottleneck, in the sense that Barr's reversion to a paragraph IV assertion limited the prospect for approval of later filers. Barr agreed to wait to enter until December 2003, when the relevant Bayer patent expired. 51 The Cipro settlement attracted numerous antitrust challenges. Twentyfour class action complaints were consolidated in multidistrict litigation. 52 In addition, state court suits are pending in California (nine complaints), Florida (one), Kansas (one), New York (two), and Wisconsin (one). 53 In the Wisconsin case, oral argument in state supreme court was scheduled for December 2006. 54 In California and Kansas, litigation has been stayed pending resolution of the federal multidistrict litigation.
K-Dur
Potassium chloride in an extended-release form, sold by Schering-Plough under the brand name K-Dur, is a replacement for electrolytes lost from the body as a side effect of certain antihypertension drugs. U.S. sales of K-Dur in 1997, the year of settlement, totaled $190 million. 55 Schering and first-filer Upsher-Smith reached agreement in June 1997. 56 Schering agreed to pay Upsher $60 million. Upsher retained eligibility for the exclusivity period and the expectation of enjoying it upon entry, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. From Schering's standpoint, the settlement neutralized the first-filer threat. The settlement also created a bottleneck. Schering also received licenses to five Upsher products, including Niacor, a sustained-release niacin product. This grant was described as the basis for Schering's cash payment. Schering also agreed to pay milestone royalty payments and a percentage royalty on sales, but the project came to nothing and these payments were never made. Upsher agreed to wait to enter until September 2001, later than the likely entry date if Upsher had won but earlier than the expiration of the relevant patent in September 2006. 57 Upsher agreed to delay marketing not only the particular 53 See Barr Pharmaceuticals 10-Q, supra note 2. 54 
Naprelan
Naproxen sodium, sold by Elan under the brand name Naprelan, is a nonsteroidal drug used to manage pain, fever, and inflammation. U.S. sales of Naprelan in 1999, the year of the settlement, were $59 million. 65 Elan and first-filer SkyePharma reached agreement in May 1999, the details of which are difficult to discern from publicly available information. Elan granted SkyePharma the right to manufacture, possibly under Elan's NDA. So far as appears, SkyePharma retained entitlement to the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. 66 From Elan's perspective, the settlement removed a first-filer threat, and appears to create a bottleneck. Terms of entry are unclear.
The Naprelan settlement has attracted several challenges. Generic competitor Andrx filed an antitrust suit in 2001. 67 In 2005, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, and the case remains pending on remand. A purchaser suit was filed in 2002 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where it has remained on the suspense docket pending the outcome of the Florida case. 68 
Procardia XL
Nifedipine in an extended-release form, sold by Pfizer under the brand name Procardia XL, is a medication to reduce blood pressure and manage angina. U.S. sales of Procardia XL in 2000, the year of settlement, were $311 million. 69 Pfizer and first filer Mylan reached agreement in February 2000. Pfizer granted Mylan a license to sell a private-label version of Procardia XL supplied by Pfizer. The license covered not only the 30 milligram dosage for which Mylan was the first filer, but also 60 and 90 milligram forms. It is not clear to what extent the private-label sales provided compensation to Mylan. Likely Mylan also had but declined the option, instead of private label sales, of a patent license agreement with a royalty on net sales. 70 So far as appears, Mylan retained entitlement to the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. From Pfizer's perspective, the settlement removed the first-filer threat and created a bottleneck.
The Procardia XL settlement attracted several challenges. Competitor generic firm Mylan filed an antitrust suit, complaining in part of the bottleneck. 71 After the district court denied a motion to dismiss, Pfizer paid $9 million to settle the case. A set of purchaser suits were consolidated in a West Virginia district court. 72 After the district court denied class status in 2004, a settlement was reached dismissing some cases. 73
B. Incomplete settlements
In the settlements in this section, the first-filing generic firm received no assurance of being able to enjoy the exclusivity period. The first two settlements, Cardizem CD and Hytrin, are interim settlements in which the innovator secured a delay in the first filing generic firm's entry pending resolution of the underlying patent dispute. (A second settlement involving Hytrin is not an interim agreement, but is included here for simplicity.) The third settlement, involving Prozac, resolved some but not all of the claims at issue. 70 The basis for this conclusion is that Procardia XL is likely the second "supply agreement" on p. 30 of the 2002 FTC study. As with Procardia XL, the supply agreement described by the FTC involved a drug with sales between $250 million and $500 million; was reached ten years, nine months before patent expiration (compare the 
Cardizem CD
Diltiazem hydrochloride in a controlled-release form, sold by Hoescht Marion Roussel under the brand name Cardizem CD, is a widely prescribed medication for hypertension. 74 U.S. sales of Cardizem CD in 1997, the year of settlement, were $692 million. 75 Hoescht and first-filer Andrx 76 reached agreement in September 1997. 77 Hoescht agreed to pay Andrx $10 million per quarter, plus an additional $60 million per year if Hoescht lost the patent suit. Total payments equaled $89.83 million. As for the exclusivity period, Andrx retained its exclusivity entitlement, and agreed not to give it up. But the settlement did not provide relief from the prospect of losing the patent suit, which continued. From Hoescht's standpoint, the "interim" agreement removed the risk that Andrx would launch immediately upon receiving FDA approval, though it did not resolve the patent suit. The settlement also created a bottleneck, since later ANDA-IV filers could not receive FDA approval until 180 days after entry of a first filer with exclusivity eligibility. Andrx agreed to delay marketing not only the particular drug at issue, but also other noninfringing products.
The Cardizem CD settlement attracted several challenges. An FTC consent decree was entered in 2001. 78 Generic competitor Biovail filed an antitrust suit, and after the D.C. Circuit denied dismissal in 2001, the parties settled in 2002. 79 Litigation by purchasers yielded several large settlements-$110 million for direct purchasers and $80 million for indirect purchasers and state attorneys general-and in 2003, the Sixth Circuit condemned the settlement as a violation of antitrust law. 80 
Hytrin
Terazozin hydrochloride, sold by Abbott under the brand name Hytrin, is an antihypertension drug used to treat high blood pressure. U.S. sales of Hytrin in 1998, the year of settlement, were $542 million. 81 To understand the settlement that resulted, it is necessary to review briefly the underlying patent suit. Two forms of terazosin hydrochloride, dihydrate and "Form IV" anhydrous, and two patents, are particularly relevant. Dihydrate was the form used by Abbott in Hytrin, protected by a patent expiring in February 2000. 82 Generic firm Geneva proposed to make a bioequivalent Form IV product, which would not infringe the dihydrate patent but would infringe a patent on Form IV not scheduled to expire until October 2014. 83 Geneva acknowledged infringement of the Form IV patent but argued, ultimately successfully, that this patent was invalid.
Abbott and first-filer Geneva reached agreement in April 1998. 84 Abbott agreed to make payments of up to $101 million. The formula was to pay $4.5 million per month until a district court judgment. If the generic firm won in district court, $4.5 million per month would go into escrow during appeal, payable if Geneva won. The agreement was scheduled to end at the earliest of the invalidation of the Form IV patent, another generic firm's entry, and February 17, 2000. 85 The latter date was the expiration of the dihydrate patent, not directly relevant to the litigation. 86 As for the 180-day exclusivity period, Geneva settlement). According to the release, $21 million was allocated to individual consumers, $4.5 million to state agencies, $15.6 million to plaintiffs' counsel, $2.5 million to state attorneysgeneral, and an additional sum to health plans. 81 85 $4.5 million per month, applied to nine months of 1998, twelve months of 1999, and 1.61 months of 2000. 86 The inclusion of the '532 dihydrate patent's expiration as a settlement term is initially puzzling, since this patent was not directly relevant to the ongoing dispute. A possible explanation is that Abbott understood that the last possible moment for exclusive Hytrin sales was February 2000-that after the '207 patent expired, generic firms would be free to sell a dihydrate version. The parties may have concluded that an expiration date for the agreement that extended beyond that point would raise an antitrust risk. retained its exclusivity entitlement, and agreed not to give it up. But the settlement apparently did not provide relief from the prospect of losing the patent suit, which continued. From Abbott's standpoint, the "interim" agreement removed the risk that Geneva would launch immediately upon receiving FDA approval-and even if Geneva won in the district court, during the pendency of appeal-though it did not resolve the patent suit. The settlement also created a bottleneck. Geneva agreed to delay marketing not only the particular drug at issue, but all terazosin hydrochloride products, even if noninfringing.
Abbott and later filer Zenith 87 reached agreement in March 1998. 88 Abbott agreed to pay Zenith up to slightly more than $45 million. The formula was $3 million up front, $3 million in the second quarter of 1998, $6 million per quarter for the last two quarters of 1999 and throughout 2000, and slightly more than $3 million for the prorated period between January 1 and February 17, 2000. (As with the Abbot-Geneva agreement, the latest end to the agreement was the expiration of the dihydrate patent.) If a generic firm entered, the payments would cease, except for $3 million per quarter during another firm's exclusivity period. Exclusivity was not an issue because as a later filer, Zenith had no eligibility. Unlike the Geneva agreement, this was a final agreement. Zenith agreed to enter no earlier than in February 2000, and to delay marketing of all terazosin hydrochloride products, even if noninfringing.
The Hytrin settlements have attracted several challenges. The FTC reached a consent decree as to the Abbott-Geneva agreement in 2000, apparently having taken no action with respect to the Zenith agreement. 89 A variety of antitrust suits were consolidated in multidistrict litigation. 90 Zenith reached a settlement. In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court's conclusion of per se illegality as to the Geneva agreement had been "premature." The plaintiffs subsequently narrowed their case to the "appellate stay" period of the 87 Zenith became part of Ivax, which is now part of Teva. settlement, which prohibited entry during the pendency of the patent appealthat is, after the district court's invalidation of the patent in September 1998, and before the Federal Circuit's affirmance in August 1999. On remand, the district court concluded that the appellate stay component violated antitrust law, and entered summary judgment for defendants. Most plaintiffs in the MDL litigation settled. 91 One case that did not settle, brought by Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, returned to the Central District of California upon its release from MDL. In 2006, after a trial, the jury returned a verdict for defendants. Appeal in the Ninth Circuit is pending. 92
Prozac
Fluoxetine hydrochloride, sold by Eli Lilly and Company under the brand name Prozac, is an antidepressant. U.S. sales of Prozac in 1999, the year of the settlement, were $2.09 billion. 93 Two patents are particularly relevant to the subsequent settlement: the compound patent, which expired in August 2001, 94 and a follow-on patent on Prozac's administration to prohibit serotonin uptake, scheduled for expiration in June 2004. 95 Generic firms Barr and Geneva were each first to file on different strengths. 96 Lilly sued, and the district court ruled in favor of Lilly on two invalidity issues, obviousness-type double patenting and best mode. That left several other claims to resolve at trial.
In January 1999, on the eve of trial, Lilly reached agreement with Barr and Geneva as to the remaining claims. 97 Lilly paid Barr and Geneva $4 million in 91 The amount of settlement was reportedly $30,700,000. See Cafferty, supra, at 4. total. By giving up the remaining claims, the generic firms appealed more rapidly the adverse summary judgment ruling. Lilly, for its part, avoided a trial on the claims, and avoided the prospect of a launch at risk upon the expiration of the automatic stay.
In May 2001, the Federal Circuit ruled the follow-on patent invalid. 98 Barr and Geneva entered in August 2001, upon expiration of the compound patent, each with exclusivity for different strengths.
IV. Second-wave settlements
This Part describes settlements in ten drugs reached since March 2004. For settlements involving seven drugs, the 180-day generic exclusivity period is potentially relevant. For three other drugs, exclusivity is not an issue because no generic filer has potential eligibility.
A. Settlements implicating exclusivity
Niaspan
Niacin in an extended-release form, sold by Kos 99 under the brand name Niaspan, is a medicine to manage cholesterol, primarily by raising HDL ("good") cholesterol. U.S. sales of Niaspan in 2005, the year of settlement, were $380 million. 100 To understand the settlement that resulted, it is necessary to review briefly the underlying patent suit. 101 respectively, cover the product. 102 Barr filed an ANDA-IV with respect to these patents, and Kos sued. As new Kos patents issued beyond these two, Barr added new paragraph IV certifications to its ANDA, and Kos filed additional patent infringement suits in New York district court. The automatic stay was scheduled for expiration on March 30, 2005, whereupon Barr would be free to launch at risk. The trial was expected to occur in early 2006.
The challenged patents also protected Advicor, a second product marketed by Kos. Advicor is a tablet containing a mixture of Niaspan and lovastatin, a drug that lowers LDL ("bad") cholesterol. Worldwide sales of Advicor in 2005 were $116 million. 103 Kos and first-filer Barr reached agreement in April 2005. 104 Kos agreed to pay Barr an undisclosed amount, described as compensation for helping to promote the drug. Kos also agreed to make payments initially and quarterly, described as compensation for manufacturing services. So far as appears, Barr retained entitlement to the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. royalties, and milestone payments. 109 Cephalon also agreed to pay $82.6 million for materials, beginning in 2006 and lasting for six years, to three unnamed "modafinil suppliers." The announcements of agreements with Teva and Ranbaxy explicitly mention supply agreements; likely they are two of the three suppliers. The agreement with Barr includes purchase of inventory, but it is unclear whether this is Cephalon's third supply agreement. The descriptions below assume that Teva, Ranbaxy, and Barr are the three suppliers. If the three suppliers are correctly identified, then Barr, Ranbaxy, and Teva share in payments of up to $218.6 million. In addition to these three agreements, Cephalon settled with Mylan, as described below. After these settlements, Cephalon's CEO stated that thanks to the agreements, "we were able to get six more years of patent protection. That's $4 billion in sales that no one had expected." 110 The four settlements share certain features. The generic firm receives cash, described as consideration for value other than delay. The generic firm retains shared entitlement to the exclusivity period, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. From Cephalon's standpoint, the settlement neutralizes the first filer and creates a bottleneck (as to later firms, not the other first filers). The generic firm agrees to enter as of October 2011, or six months later if Cephalon secures a six-month pediatric extension. That date is later than entry if a generic firm won a patent challenge, but earlier than the October 2014 expiration of the patent at issue. 111 Cephalon reached agreement with Teva in December 2005. 112 In that settlement, the cash is described as consideration for modafinil-related intellectual property and "certain arrangements . . . related to Teva's manufacture and supply" of modafinil to Cephalon. Cephalon also reached agreement with Ranbaxy in December 2005. 113 The visible terms are identical, with the omission of a manufacturing component; intellectual property and supply "certain arrangements . . . related to Ranbaxy's supply" are described as consideration for payment.
Cephalon reached agreement with Mylan in January 2006. 114 The agreement apparently includes no intellectual property licenses or supply agreement. 115 Instead, Mylan will receive payments (distinct from the payments described above) as part of certain product development collaboration agreements. 116 Cephalon reached agreement with Barr in February 2006. In that settlement, the cash is described as consideration for intellectual property licenses and inventory. . 115 Cephalon's announced list of modafinil IP providers includes Teva, Ranbaxy, and Barr, but omits Mylan, and the announcements of the Mylan agreement omitted mention of intellectual property or supply. 116 Cephalon Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 9, 2006) (noting that parties had "entered into two product development collaboration agreements under which the companies will explore utilizing Mylan Technologies Inc.'s transdermal technology to address pain and certain central nervous system disorders. Under the arrangements, Cephalon will have an option to develop and commercialize the products in exchange for payment of milestones and ongoing royalties based on net sales of the products.").
117 antitrust suit, alleging that the bottleneck has blocked it from approval of its ANDA.
Actiq
Oral transmucosal fentanyl citrate, sold by Cephalon under the brand name Actiq, is a pain reliever delivered as a "lollipop," a lozenge attached to a handle. U.S. sales of Actiq in 2006, the year of settlement, were $545 million. 119 To understand the resulting settlement, it is helpful to review the underlying patent suit. In August 2004, Cephalon granted Barr a license to market generic Actiq, starting in September 2006. This was due to the FTC's insistence that Cephalon grant a license as a condition for permitting its merger with Cima Labs, a company making a next-generation pain reliever. 120 122 The patent at issue, however, was set to expire in September 2006, 123 so the practical effect of the patent suit is unclear. At the time of the suit, Cephalon declared that it expected no change in the likely date of market entry. 124 The patent suit was unlikely to be resolved before patent expiration, and without a ruling the automatic stay would remain pending until then. It is possible that Barr thought it might win quickly, and secure early entry protected by exclusivity. A second possibility is that settlement of this suit provided a means for additional compensation from Cephalon to Barr in connection with the simultaneous settlement of Provigil litigation. It is possible, however, that Barr receives a portion of Fentora sales. And if so, the Actiq litigation and settlement served to provide an additional means for Cephalon to make a payment to Barr. Recall the discussion in Part II.A.4, describing a particular settlement in which the brand-name firm paid royalties on a different version of the drug. The Actiq agreement fits this discussion in important respects, provided that "capsule" is understood to be a reference to the lozenge delivery mechanism of Actiq. As in the FTC account, Cephalon granted Barr a license to an authorized generic of the lozenge form; this lozenge form was the subject of the relevant litigation; Cephalon acquired a new tablet form of the product, that is, Fentora; and later, the parties dismissed the litigation involving the lozenge form. If the match is correct, then it can be inferred from the FTC report that one term of the settlement was for Cephalon to pay Barr a royalty on sales of Fentora.
The Actiq settlement has attracted an FTC investigation. 126 Upon the launch, certain provisions protecting Apotex took effect. Bristol had accepted a contractual delay in its ability to seek a preliminary injunction if Apotex launched at risk. Bristol also agreed that if Apotex launched a generic product and was later found liable for patent infringement, its damages would be capped at a reduced level.
Plavix
Other provisions of the agreement never took effect. 130 For example, Bristol had agreed to pay Apotex $40 million, described as compensation for inventory. Apotex retained eligibility for the exclusivity period and the expectation of enjoying it upon entry, without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. Two other sources of compensation were present in the March agreement, and Apotex alleges (and Bristol denies) that they were unwritten terms of the May revision: a commitment not to launch an authorized generic during Apotex's exclusivity period, and a breakup fee to Apotex if regulators rejected the deal. The breakup fee increased with the degree of delay in the regulators' response. BMS secured a six-month pediatric extension.) That date was later than entry if Apotex won its patent challenge, but earlier than the November 2011 expiration of the patent at issue. 131 Apotex also agreed to transfer inventory to Bristol, described as consideration for Bristol's cash payment.
The failed Plavix settlement has attracted several challenges. In 2006, the Department of Justice opened a criminal inquiry into whether Bristol had misrepresented the content of its deal to regulators by omitting mention of the a breakup fee and a no-authorized-generic covenant. Also in 2006, purchasers filed an antitrust suit in an Ohio district court. 132
Adderall XR
Adderall XR is the brand name for a mixture of amphetamine salts in an extended release form, sold by Shire and prescribed to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Worldwide sales of Adderall XR in 2006, the year of settlement, were $864 million. 133 Shire and first-filer Barr reached agreement in August 2006. 134 Shire agreed to pay Barr a net amount of up to $102 million. That is, Shire agreed to pay a Barr subsidiary up to $165 million-$25 million immediately and up to $140 million over eight years-described as compensation for product development. And Barr agreed to pay Shire $63 million, described as compensation for transferring Shire's rights to Adderall IR (immediate-release) tablets.
Barr retained exclusivity eligibility without fear of losing it by losing a patent suit. Moreover, during the 180-day exclusivity period, Shire agreed not to compete with Barr through an authorized generic. (Barr will pay Shire a royalty during the exclusivity period; thereafter, the license is nonexclusive and royalty-free.) 135 Barr also received the rights to Shire's Adderall IR product and to purchase a supply of Adderall IR from Shire. It is unclear whether the deal price of $63 million or transfer price for supply permits significant compensation from Shire to Barr. From Shire's standpoint, the settlement removed the first filer threat and created a bottleneck. Barr agreed to enter as of April 2009, a date later than if Barr had launched at risk or after winning a patent challenge, and earlier than the expiration of the last-to-expire patent. 136 Shire also received product development pertaining to six proprietary Barr women's health products, described as consideration for the $165 million payment. As to these products, there is also provision for Barr to supply product to Shire, in exchange for additional compensation.
Shire and later filer Impax reached agreement in January 2006. 137 Impax received cash, described as compensation for promotion of another drug. Exclusivity was not an issue because as a later filer, Impax had no eligibility. Impax agreed to enter in January 2010. Shire also received promotion for Carbatrol, a Shire epilepsy drug, described as consideration for the cash payment.
The Shire-Barr agreement has attracted an FTC investigation, opened in October 2006. 138 firm used a procedure that does not provide for an exclusivity period, as with Alphagan.
infringement suit in Illinois district court asserting two other patents. 158 (A similar suit was filed against Ranbaxy in December 2004.) 159 Trial was scheduled for March 2007.
A district court granted a preliminary injunction to Abbott, but in June 2006, the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction, concluding that Teva had raised substantial questions as to the validity of the patents. 160 In June 2006, Teva began selling generic Biaxin XL, then stopped when Abbott filed an emergency motion.
Abbott reached agreements with Teva and Ranbaxy in July 2006. 161 Settlement terms were not disclosed, except that Teva agreed not to enter "at this time."
